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South Korea’s growth miracle has been well documented. A large set of institutional and policy reforms in
the early 1960s is thought to have contributed to the country’s extraordinary performance. In this paper, we
assess the importance of one key set of policies, the trade policy reforms in Korea, as well as the concurrent
GATT tariﬀ reductions. We develop a model of neoclassical growth and trade that highlights two forces by
which lower trade barriers can lead to increased per worker GDP: comparative advantage and specialization,
and capital accumulation. We calibrate the model and simulate the eﬀects of three sets of tariﬀ reductions
that occurred between the early 1962 and 1995. Our main ﬁnding is that the model can explain up to 32
percent of South Korea’s catch-up to the G7 countries in output per worker in the manufacturing sector.
We ﬁnd that the eﬀects of the tariﬀ reductions taken together are about twice as large as the sum of each
reduction applied individually.
JEL Classiﬁcation code: F4, O110, O4, O530
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South Korea’s growth experience since the early 1960s has been widely documented and is generally
considered to be a miracle. Figure 1 illustrates that in 1961, according to the Penn World Tables,
South Korea’s per capita GDP was 11% of that of the United States, about the same as in Cote
D’Ivoire and Sri Lanka. By 1995 its per capita GDP was 49% of the United States, comparable
to Portugal or Slovenia. In the intervening period, South Korea (hereafter, "Korea") experienced
growth rates of real per capita GDP that averaged 6.6 percent per year.
Figure 1: Ratio of South Korea to United States GDP per capita
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A key feature of this miracle was an enormous increase in Korea’s international trade. Figure
2 shows that Korea’s merchandise export share of GDP rose from just 2 percent in 1962 to 30
percent in less than 20 years. Virtually all of this increase was in manufactured goods. In 1960,
only 35.2 percent of Korea’s merchandise exports consisted of manufactured goods. In 1995, it was
96.9 percent.1
The growth miracle came on the heels of a sweeping set of policy reforms following the ascension
of Park Chung Hee to power in 1961. One major area of reforms was in trade policy. Park believed
1If the food, beverages and tobacco sector is counted as manufacturing, the manufacturing share of total mer-
chandise imports was 46.6 percent in 1960 and 98.9 percent in 1995.







































that Korea needed to start exporting, but recognized that the country had few natural resources.
Consequently, trade policy shifted from largely focusing on import substitution to one focused
on export expansion. Hong (1979) documents 38 reforms designed to promote exports. Of these
reforms, two stand out. In the early 1960s, Korea eliminated tariﬀs on imported inputs and capital
goods, but only as long as these imports were used to produce goods for export. The imports could
not be used for production of goods sold domestically. Westphal and Kim (1977) show that, at least
until 1975, this was the most important export-oriented policy. Second, beginning in the 1970s and
continuing for the next two decades, Korea engaged in a broader, gradual reduction of tariﬀ rates
from about 40 percent to 13 percent. During this period, there were signiﬁcant changes occurring
in the global trading environment, as well. Perhaps GATT’s two most important set of global tariﬀ
reductions occurred between 1968 and 1986, the Kennedy Round and the Tokyo Round.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the importance of these trade reforms in explaining
Korea’s growth in GDP per worker and trade between 1962 and 1995, the growth miracle period.
Our methodology departs from the usual empirical methodology of the trade and growth literature.
We conduct our quantitative assessment through the lens of a neoclassical model of growth and
trade. The growth theory underlying our model is Cass-Koopmans. The trade theory underlying
2the model is Ricardian; relative productivity diﬀerences across countries helps determine diﬀerences
in comparative advantage. Two additional features of the model are that some goods are produced
in multiple stages and investment goods are tradable. These features allow the calibrated model to
capture important features of the Korean data.
In the model, lower tariﬀsr a i s ee ﬃciency because it facilitates specialization. The presence of
multiple stages of production deepens the extent of specialization. Countries specialize by stages,
rather than by goods. The eﬃciency gains raise aggregate total factor productivity even though
there are no intrinsic increases in the productivity of any individual good. In addition, lower tariﬀs
generate increased imports of investment goods occurs. The total factor productivity (TFP) gains
and capital accumulation ensuing from the trade liberalization leads to increases in per capita GDP.
We calibrate the model to match key features of the Korea’s manufacturing sector vis-a-vis the
G7 countries in 1962 and 1963. We then simulate the tariﬀ reductions mentioned above. Our main
ﬁndings are as follows. Taken together, the tariﬀ reductions can explain up to 32 percent of Korea’s
catch-up in manufacturing output per worker. Both aggregate TFP gains (62 percent) and capital
accumulation (38 percent) contribute to the catch-up. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that the eﬀect of the
three trade policies taken together is almost twice as large as the sum of the eﬀect from each policy
applied separately. There is a large interaction eﬀect. In terms of individual policies, the broad
Korea tariﬀ reduction has the greatest eﬀect on the catch-up. We also show that the presence
of multiple stages of production and imported investment goods are very important in explaining
both the catch-up and the growth in trade.
The role of trade policy in aﬀecting long run growth is a story involving macroeconomics, devel-
opment economics, and international economics. Economists from each of these sub-disciplines have
approached this question with varying empirical methodologies including reduced form regressions,
micro and macro growth regressions, event studies, and growth accounting and structural change
accounting. In this large literature, we believe one of the most important is Rodriguez and Rodrik
(2001). Rodriguez and Rodrik (RR) demonstrated that some of the leading empirical research
that found a strong role for trade policy had either ﬂaws in the methodology or results that were
not robust. Two of RR’s prescriptions for future research were to study contingent relationships
and to study the "channels through which trade policies inﬂuence economic performance." Our
methodology is consistent with these prescriptions. We conduct a case study, i.e., a particularly
sharp contingent relationship, and by using a structural model, we study several channels by which
trade can inﬂuence growth.
3On the theoretical side, the last 20 years has seen the development of the endogenous and semi-
endogenous growth frameworks and the numerous models engendered by them. However, very
few models have been applied to study actual growth experiences, including the growth miracles.2
While our model is not a direct descendant of the endogenous or semi-endogenous growth literature,
we believe our neoclassical framework is a useful one and provides a benchmark for further studies
using the more modern frameworks.
The next section presents the model and discusses the core intuition of the eﬀects of trade
barrier reductions. Section 3 provides the calibration of the model along with the key facts and
policies that are used to both calibrate and evaluate the model. This is followed by the simulation
of the trade liberalizations and the results. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2 The Model
In this section, we describe the model. The model combines neoclassical trade with neoclassical
growth. In a neoclassical trade framework, comparative advantage and the costs of international
trade determine the pattern of production, specialization, and trade. We employ a Ricardian setting
that draws from Eaton and Kortum (2002), as well as Yi (2003, 2008).3 In the neoclassical growth
framework, aggregate TFP and the stock of capital determine per capita output. The link between
these two frameworks is that trade barrier reductions — by facilitating the reallocation of resources
to their most eﬃcient use — will increase aggregate TFP in the economy. If the trade barrier
reductions also facilitate imports of investment goods, the aggregate capital stock will increase.
Trade will increase of course, as well. A channel that can potentially accentuate the eﬀect of trade
barrier reductions is multi-stage production and the possibility of vertical specialization. Below,
we ﬁrst lay out the benchmark model, then we describe some of the key transmission channels. We
also show how the model is modiﬁed to allow for one of Korea’s trade policy reforms.
2.1 Technologies
There are two countries, H and F. There are two sectors, an investment goods sector and a
consumption-cum-intermediate goods sector. (Hereafter, we will refer to the second sector as the
consumption sector.) Each sector consists of a continuum of goods. An investment good z ∈ [0,1]
2Several closed economy models of growth have been calibrated, some even to the Korean experience. See, for
example, Papageorgiu and Perez-Sebastian (2006). However, to our knowledge there have been little or no studies in
an open economy setting.
3See also Alvarez and Lucas (2007) and Waugh (2007).
4is produced from capital, labor, and the aggregate intermediate good. These investment goods are
costlessly combined to yield an aggregate, non-traded, investment good that adds to the economy’s
capital stock. A consumption good z ∈ [0,1] is produced in two sequential stages, i.e., there is
multi-stage production of consumption goods.4 First, capital, labor and the aggregate interme-
diate are combined to make a "stage 1" good. Then, the stage 1 good is combined with capital
and labor to make the "stage 2" good. These stage 2 goods are costlessly combined to yield an
aggregate, non-traded good used for consumption and as an intermediate in production. All stages
of the continuum of investment and consumption goods are tradable. Only the aggregate goods
are non-tradeable.
The production function for stage 1 consumption goods is given by:
yi1(z)=( Ai1(z)ki1(z)αli1(z)1−α)1−θ1Mi(z)θ1 z ∈ [0,1] (1)
where Ai1(z) is country i’s total factor productivity associated with stage 1 good z,a n dki1(z),
li1(z),a n dMi(z) are country i’s inputs of capital, labor and aggregate intermediate Mi used to
produce yi1(z). The share of intermediates in production is θ1.5 This ﬁrst stage is a Cobb-Douglas
version of the production function in Eaton and Kortum (2002) with value-added augmented to
include capital.
The production function for stage 2 consumption goods is given by:
yi2(z)=Ai2(z)ki2(z)αli2(z)1−α)1−θ2xi1(z)θ2 z ∈ [0,1] (2)
where xi1(z) is country i’s use of y1(z) for stage 2 production, Ai2(z) is country i’s total factor
productivity associated with stage 2 good z,a n dki2(z) and li2(z) are country i’s labor used in
producing yi2(z). Under autarky, xi2(z)=yi2(z). The share of intermediates for this stage is θ2.
The stage 2 consumption goods are costlessly assembled to produce an aggregate non-traded
good Xi, which is used for consumption, Ci, and as an intermediate in production, Mi:







⎦ = Ci + Mi
4Eaton and Kortum (2001) show that capital goods production is dominated by a few advanced countries. Con-
sequently, we assume these goods are produced in a single stage.
5The ﬁrst stage of production in this model diﬀers from that in Yi (2003) in its inclusion of intermediates. This
facilitates matching both gross output, trade, and value-added (GDP) in the calibration.
5where xi2(z) is the amount of the stage 2 good z used to produce Xi.
Investment goods are also produced from capital, labor and the aggregate intermediate:
yiI(z)=( AiI(z)kα
iI(z)liI(z)1−α)1−θ1MiI(z)θ1 z ∈ [0,1] (3)
where AiI(z) is country i’s total factor productivity (TFP) associated with the investment good z,
and kiI(z), liI(z),a n dMiI(z) are country i’s inputs of capital, labor and aggregate intermediate
Mi used to produce yiI(z). These investment goods are costlessly assembled into an aggregate
non-traded investment good, Ii:








where Ii(z) is country i’s use of yiI(z) for production of Ii.
Note that the capital share of value-added is the same across all production functions and coun-
tries. This is a requirement for comparative advantage to be based solely on Ricardian motives. In
a Ricardian trade model, comparative advantage is based on relative productivity diﬀerences across
countries. That is, the TFP terms Ai1(z),A i2(z), and AiI(z) determine comparative advantage.




i i = H,F (5)
The mean of A is increasing in T. n is a smoothness parameter that governs the heterogeneity
of the draws from the productivity distribution. The larger n is, the lower the heterogeneity or
variance of A.
2.2 Trade Costs
When the stage 1 or stage 2 consumption goods or the investment goods are shipped from country
i to country j, they incur three types of trade costs, all expressed in ad valorem terms: tariﬀs, bij;
transport costs, dij, and a stand-in for all other trade costs, trij. Total trade costs are given by
1+τij =( 1+bij)(1+dij)(1+trij). The costs are modeled as iceberg costs. So, if 1 unit of a good z
is shipped from country H to country F, for example, then 1/(1+τHF) units of z arrive in country
F.6 We assume that within country trade costs are zero. 1+τix(z) denotes the shipping costs
6Tariﬀ r e v e n u ei sa s s u m et ob e" t o s s e di n t ot h eo c e a n " .
6associated with country i purchasing good z of type x (stage 1 consumption, stage 2 consumption,
or investment) from its cheapest source, i.e., 1+τix =1+τjix if country j is the cheapest source for
country i’s purchase. Note that the cheapest source for country i’s purchase of stage 1 consumption
good z may not be the cheapest source for country i’s purchase of stage 2 consumption good z or
of investment good z.
2.3 Firms
Firms maximize proﬁts taking prices as given. Speciﬁcally, in each period, they hire capital and
labor, and purchase inputs in order to produce their output, which they sell at market prices.
Stage 1 consumption good ﬁrms in country i maximize:
pi1(z)yi1(z) − wili1(z) − riki1(z) − PiMi(z) (6)
where pi1(z) is the factory gate price of yi1(z),a n dwi, ri and Pi are the wage rate, rental rate, and
aggregate intermediate price, respectively, in country i.
Stage 2 consumption good ﬁrms in country i maximize:
pi2(z)yi2(z) − wili2(z) − riki2(z) − (1 + τi1(z))pi1(z)xi1(z) (7)
where pi2(z) is the factory gate price of yi2(z),a n d1+τi(z) is the total trade cost incurred in
shipping the stage 1 good z from country i’s cheapest source to country i.




(1 + τi2(z))pj2(z)xi2(z)dz (8)
where country j is the supplier of stage 2 good z to country i. Pi is the price of the aggregate
consumption and intermediate good Xi.
Similarly, investment good ﬁrms in country i maximize:
piI(z)yiI(z) − wiliI(z) − rikiI(z) − PiMiI(z) (9)




(1 + τiI(z))pjI(z)Ii(z)dz (10)
where country j is the supplier of the investment good z to country i. PiI is the price of the
aggregate investment good Ii.
2.4 Households







subject to a sequence of budget constraints:
PitCit + PiItIit = witLit + ritKit (12)
where Cit is consumption of the aggregate consumption good in period t. The elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution is 1
σ. Households own the capital and rent it period-by-period to the
consumption and investment goods ﬁrms. Note that we do not allow the countries to run current
account deﬁcits.7 Capital is accumulated in the standard way:
Kit+1 =( 1− δ)Kit + Iit (13)
2.5 Equilibrium conditions
All factor and goods markets are characterized by perfect competition. The following factor market











7In fact, Korea ran current account deﬁcits during the 1960s and 1970s, and then balanced trade or surpluses


















(1 + τi1(z))xi1(z) (16)
where 1+τi1(z) is the total trade cost incurred by shipping the stage 1 good from country i’s
cheapest source to country i. The condition states that total production of the stage 1 good equals
the total demand, inclusive of trade costs, for that good. A similar set of conditions applies to each















(1 + τiI(z))Ii(z) (18)
Finally, the aggregate consumption and intermediate good must be completely absorbed:







If these conditions hold, then each country’s exports equals its imports, i.e., balanced trade
holds. We now deﬁne the equilibrium of this model:
Deﬁnition 1 An equilibrium is a sequence of goods prices, {pi1(z), pi2(z), piI(z), Pi, PiI};f a c -
tor prices, {wi,r i};f a c t o r i n p u t s , {li1(z),li2(z),liI(z),ki1(z),ki2(z),kiI(z)}; intermediate inputs,
{Mi(z),MiI(z)}; and outputs, {yi1(z),yi2(z),yiI(z),xi1(z),xi2(z),Ii(z),Ci,Ii,Mi},z ∈ [0,1],i=
H,F, such that the ﬁrst order conditions to the households’ maximization problem 11, the ﬁrst or-
der conditions to the ﬁrms’ maximization problems 6-10, as well as the market clearing conditions
14-19 are satisﬁed.
92.6 Trade, Vertical Specialization, and Growth and Income
2.6.1 Trade
Under autarky, each country produces the entire continuum of stage 1 consumption goods, stage 2
consumption goods, and investment goods. There is no specialization. Under completely free and
frictionless trade — tariﬀs, transport costs, and all other trade costs are zero — then there will be
complete specialization. Each stage of each good will be produced by only one country. Which
country produces which stage of which good depends on the interplay of relative productivity
diﬀerences across countries and relative factor costs. For example, consider an investment good z.
There are two possible production methods, producing it in country H or producing it in country









AFI(z)1−θ1 ≡ pFI(z) (20)







where ω = wH/wF, ρ = rH/rF, and we treat the foreign aggregate consumption (and intermediate)
good as the numeraire. The above equation essentially says that if the ratio of H to F production
costs is less than the ratio of TFPs, the good will be produced in the home country. More generally,
t h ew o r l dp r i c eo fa ni n v e s t m e n tg o o dz, pI(z)=m i n[ pHI(z),p FI(z)].
It will not be possible that one country produces all goods more cheaply, because in general
equilibrium, wages and rental rates are determined so that each country’s production equals its
spending or, put diﬀerently, each country’s exports equals its imports. Each country will ﬁnd some
goods for which the other country is the low cost producer. This is the essence of comparative
advantage and general equilibrium.
Suppose that consumption and investment goods were produced only in a single stage. If both
countries had the same labor endowment, and if both sets of productivities were drawn from the
same Frechét distribution, then in equilibrium wages and rents would be equalized, and the export
share of GDP would be 1/2. Each country would specialize in half the goods, and would import
the other half.
For consumption good z, there are four possible production methods: HH,FH,HF, and FF,
where FH means the ﬁrst stage is produced in country F and the second stage is produced in
10country H. If the second stage is produced in H,t h e npH2(z)=m i n [ pHH(z),p FH(z)]. Similarly, if
the stage 2 good is produced in F,t h e npF2(z)=m i n [ pHF(z),p FF(z)]. Then, the world price of
the good, p2(z)=m i n[ pH2(z),p F2(z)] = min[pHH(z),p FH(z),p HF(z),p FF(z)].
If one country is relatively more productive at making investment goods than consumption
goods, then it will specialize in investment goods, and run a trade surplus in those goods and
a trade deﬁcit in consumption goods. However, owing to our distributional assumptions about
the productivities, the country will not specialize only in investment goods. It will import some
investment goods, and export some consumption goods. In this sense, there is intra-industry trade.8
In the presence of trade costs, there will no longer be complete specialization. Some stages of
some goods will be made by both countries, as each will ﬁnd it cheaper to purchase its own goods
rather than pay relatively high shipping costs to import an otherwise cheaper good. Trade shares
of output are lower. A key force determining the elasticity of trade with respect to trade costs
is the parameter n from the Frechét distribution, which determines the variance of heterogeneity
in productivities. If n is low, there is a great deal of heterogeneity, which makes it likely that
one country is much more productive at making a good than the other country. This means
specialization and trade patterns will not respond too much to changes in trade costs. The opposite
is true if n is high. Eaton and Kortum (2002) show that n plays the same role in their model as
σ − 1,w h e r eσ is the elasticity of substitution between goods, in the monopolistic competition or
Armington aggregator-based trade models.
2.6.2 Vertical Specialization
For consumption goods, the presence of multi-stage production leads to the possibility of verti-
cal specialization. In previous research, D. Hummels, J. Ishii, D. Rapoport, and one of us have
documented the increasing importance of vertical specialization in OECD and other countries.9
Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001) deﬁne vertical specialization as:
1. Goods are produced in multiple, sequential stages.
2. Two or more countries provide value-added in the good’s production sequence.
3. At least one country must use imported inputs in its stage of the production process, and
some of the resulting output must be exported.
8See Davis (1995), which is, to our knowledge, the ﬁrst model of intra-industry trade in a perfect competition,
comparative advantage setting.
9See Hummels, Rapoport, and Yi (1998), Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001), and Yi (2003).














Figure 3 illustrates an example of vertical specialization involving three countries. Country 1
produces intermediate goods and exports them to country 2. Country 2 combines the imported
intermediates with other inputs and value-added to produce a ﬁnal good or another intermediate
good in the production chain. Finally, country 2 exports some of its output to country 3. If either
the imported intermediates or exports are absent, then there is no vertical specialization.
A necessary condition for vertically specialized production of a good to occur is for one country
to be relatively more productive in the ﬁrst stage of production and another country to be relatively
more productive in the second stage. By this deﬁnition, goods produced by production method
FH a n de x p o r t e db a c kt oc o u n t r yF or goods produced by production method HF and exported
back to country H are vertically specialized.








where k and i denote country and good, respectively. The measure is essentially the imported
intermediates content of exports. HIY use data from input-output tables to come up with industry-







1963 1967 1971 1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995
Share of merchandise GDP
Source: Bank of Korea; Input-Output Tables, selected years
level and national measures of vertical specialization for several countries over time.10 Figure 4
illustrates VS korea expressed as a share of merchandise GDP. The ﬁgure shows that it rose rapidly
in Korea from around 0.01 to 20 times that by the 1990s.
Clearly, growth in vertical specialization has been a large part of Korea’s trade experience.
This is the reason we model consumption goods production as a multi-stage process. Yi (2003)
demonstrates that with multi-stage production and vertical specialization, the eﬀects of trade bar-
rier reductions on trade are magniﬁed. Here, we provide a simple example to illustrate this point
and describe the intuition underlying it.
Consider a special case of the model in which the countries are symmetric and there is only one
sector, the consumption goods. The capital stock is exogenous and ﬁxed. We assume that the two
countries have the same capital and labor endowments, the same underlying distribution of TFPs
for each stage of production, and the same trade costs. This implies that wages, rents, and GDPs
are equalized across countries. We also assume that the ﬁrst stage of production is produced in the
country that ultimately purchases the second stage good; only the second stage production location
10An additional advantage of using input-output tables is that they facilitate measuring the indirect import content
of exports. Inputs may be imported, for example, and used to produce an intermediate good that is itself not exported,
but rather, used as an input to produce a good that is. See Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001).
13is determined by the model. Thus, if an H aggregator ﬁrm seeks to purchase an automobile, the
parts and components are assumed to be produced in H,w h i l eﬁnal assembly can occur either in
H or F. This assumption ensures that an analytical expression for the import share of GDP exists.
For goods consumed by the home country, the two possible production methods are HH and
HF. Note that production method HF involves international vertical specialization: the foreign
country imports inputs and exports its resulting output back to H. Following Dornbusch, Fischer,
and Samuelson (1977) we can arrange the stage 2 goods in descending order of the ratio of home to
foreign productivity of stage 2 production. International imports for the home country expressed
as a share of GDP are given by:
ϕ(1 − zh) (23)
where zh denotes the cutoﬀ that separates home and foreign production of stage 2 goods for the
home market. ϕ is a constant that depends on θ1 and θ2. In the appendix, we show that the






















Note that the responsiveness of the import share of GDP to trade costs depends on the "elasticity"





, which shows that multi-stage production magniﬁes the eﬀects
of trade costs. If If θ2 =2 /3, for example, the exponent on the border cost is ﬁve times larger






ﬁrst force is a "back-and-forth" force. With the HF production process, the ﬁrst stage encounters
trade costs twice; recall that the share of stage 1 goods in stage 2 production is θ2. Consequently,
the total eﬀect of the trade cost owing to this force is 1+θ2. The second force is an “eﬀective
rate of protection” force, because the concept is analogous to the concept from the literature of
that name. The trade-oﬀ between HH and HF hinges on the second stage of production. The
key idea is that the relevant or eﬀective border cost is the border cost divided by the share of
the second stage’s value-added in the total cost. This is because the second stage is the marginal
production stage, but the trade cost is applied to the entire good. If the second stage value-added
14accounts for one-third of the total cost, for example, then the eﬀective border cost is three times
the nominal border cost. This explains the 1
1−θ2 term.11 Note that the magniﬁcation of trade costs
is independent of the intermediate input share θ1. The presence of intermediates is necessary, but
not suﬃcient, for a magniﬁcation eﬀect.
2.6.3 Growth and Income
In this paper, we focus on the steady-state.12 Long run per capita income growth in our model
is driven by long run growth in TFP. In this context, our primary growth assumption is that the
growth rate of the parameter that governs the mean productivity, T, is constant across the two
countries. That is, the two countries have identical long run per capita growth rates.
The goal of our paper is to focus on Korea’s catch-up in per capita income to the G7. Hence,
with no loss of generality, we set the long run growth rate of T to be zero. We also assume that
the labor endowments are constant over time. Hence, here is no overall or per capita growth in the
steady-state. What determines the level of per capita income? The key equation arises from the






− (1 − δ) (26)
All else equal, the lower the steady-state price index for investment goods, PhI,ss, the lower the
required rate of return on capital, leading to a higher capital stock and a higher per capita income.
PhI,ss is given by:











where HI denotes the set of goods z such that the lowest cost production source is in H. A reduction
in trade costs, such as tariﬀs, lowers PhI,ss through two channels. There is a direct channel arising
from the fact that lower tariﬀ rates lowers the costs of imported investment goods, leading to a





term is via the following decomposition. In the HF production process, the
ﬁrst stage encounters trade costs when it is shipped to the foreign country. The trade costs are equivalent to a cost
on the second stage of production of (1 + τ)
θ2
1−θ2 . Trade costs are encountered again when the ﬁnal good is shipped
back to the home country from the foreign country. Now the trade cost is applied to the entire good. Consequently,
ac o s to f1+τ is imposed on the entire HF-produced good, which is eﬀectively a cost of (1 + τ)
1
1−θ2 on the second
stage of production. The total eﬀect is the product of these two forces. If trade costs fall, the cost of producing
vertically specialized goods declines by a multiple of the fall. See Yi (2008).
12We leave an analysis of transition dynamics to future work.
15reduction in the overall price index. There is a second channel in which the lower tariﬀ rates will
lead to a shift from relatively high cost domestic investment goods to relatively low cost imported
investment goods. Hence, HI falls and FI rises. Through both these channels, lower trade costs
raises trade including imports of investment goods. Because there is more specialization, there is
more eﬃcient resource allocation, leading to an increase in aggregate TFP, which also provides a
further boost to capital accumulation. Note that aggregate TFP rises even though there has been
no change in the eﬃciency of producing individual goods.
Another force leading to higher per capita income is an increase in rh,ss. This could come about,
for example, via a reduction in tariﬀsi nc o u n t r yF. At existing factor and goods prices, country
F will demand more imports of consumption and investment goods from H. This will raise the
demand for factors of production, thus bidding up wage and rental rates in H. The increase in rh,ss
will lead to greater capital accumulation. The higher factor prices leads to an overall increase in
PhI,ss, but this only partially oﬀsets the increase in capital accumulation. As above, because the
lower tariﬀs leads to a better allocation of resources, aggregate TFP will rise, thus further boosting
capital accumulation.
In general, reductions in tariﬀs on consumption goods will raise aggregate TFP, and any capital
accumulation will be a result of the TFP increase, while reductions in tariﬀs on investment goods
will raise capital accumulation with little eﬀect on aggregate TFP.
2.7 Implementing Korea’s Tariﬀ E x e m p t i o no nI m p o r t e dI n p u t sa n dI n v e s t -
ment Goods
The model presented above will be used to characterize the initial steady-state, prior to the im-
plementation of the trade policy reforms. One of Korea’s major tariﬀ reforms, as discussed in
the introduction, was to exempt imported inputs and investment goods from tariﬀs, as long as
these imports were used to make goods for export. That is, the price that Korean ﬁrms pay for
these goods depended on their ultimate destination. To implement this policy reform, the model
we laid out above needs to be modiﬁed. We introduce a second capital stock for H, KE
H,t h a ti s
used only to make goods via production method FH and that are exported.13 This second capital
stock is accumulated via a second investment good, IE
H, which is an aggregate of the continuum
of investment goods, as before, but any imported investment goods are imported duty-free. The
13We associate imported capital goods with production processes that also use imported inputs. In principle, there
could have been production processes using only domestic inputs that relied on imported capital, but our sense is












H are the price and quantity of this second aggregate investment good, τE
HI(z) is
the trade costs involved with purchasing an individual investment good, and IE
H(z) is the quantity
purchased of an individual investment good. The budget constraint for the household in country
H is now:
PHtCHt + PHItIHt + PE
HItIE




Ht is the rental rate on the aggregate export capital stock. The other maximization problems
and equilibrium conditions are adjusted accordingly.
3 Calibration to Korea and G7
We now calibrate the model presented in sections 2.1-2.5. The two countries H and F are Korea
and the G7 countries. The latter were recipients of 74% of Korea’s exports and shipped 86% of
Korea’s imports in 1962. We focus on the manufacturing sector only. That is, we apply our model
to the manufacturing sectors of the two countries. Our coverage is from 1962 through 1995, the
period that constitutes the growth miracle and that precedes the Asia ﬁnancial crisis.14 We assume
that Korea was in a steady-state in 1962 in which the current tariﬀ rates are expected to remain
forever. Then there is an unexpected tariﬀ reform, e.g., the reduction in Korean tariﬀst ot h e i r
1989 value — and this new policy is expected to remain in place forever. We also assume that there
are no distortions in the economy other than the trade barriers. This is primarily for convenience.
However, as discussed later, Westphal and Kim (1977) demonstrate that Korean exporters operated
in a free-trade environment (once the reforms were implemented).
The parameters and variables that are calibrated include the labor endowments Li of each coun-
try; the intermediate input shares θ1 and θ2, the capital income share, the Frechét heterogeneity
parameter n, the Frechét mean productivity parameters T, capital depreciation rate, preference dis-
count factor, intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and the trade cost measures for each country
and sector. The trade costs include tariﬀ rates, transport costs, and all other trade costs.
141962 is a desirable starting date, because it is the ﬁrst full year after Park took oﬃce. However, much of our
initial data is available only for 1963.
17The underlying calibration strategy is straightforward. The labor endowments, intermediate
input shares, capital income share, tariﬀ rates and transport costs are set to match their data
counterparts in 1962 or 1963. The Frechét heterogeneity parameter n, capital depreciation rate,
preference discount factor, and intertemporal elasticity of substitution are taken from the existing
literature. The Frechét mean productivity parameters for the consumption and investment sectors
and "all other" trade costs for consumption goods and investment goods are set so that the model
matches Korea’s initial relative per worker output, export share of GDP, and shares of trade that
correspond to investment goods and ﬁnal consumption goods. The challenge for the model is
whether the tariﬀ liberalizations will replicate the per worker output, trade, vertical specialization
and TFP catch-up that is in the data.
We begin by describing our measures of transport costs and tariﬀ rates. We then show how we
calibrated the other variables and the parameters of the model.
3.1 Transport Costs and Tariﬀ Rates
We now construct the data counterpart of the trade costs between country i and country j, τij =
(1 + bij)(1 + dij)(1 + trij). For transport costs, dij, we use Korea’s cif imports / fob imports ratio
in 1962, obtained from the 1992 IMF IFS yearbook. The diﬀerence between the two measures of
imports is primarily the insurance and freight costs. In 1962, the diﬀerence was equal to 9.2 percent
of Korea’s fob imports. We assume these costs apply to Korea’s exports, as well. Because our focus
is on the eﬀects of tariﬀ reductions, we hold the transport costs constant over time.
We obtain measures of Korean tariﬀ rates from Nam (1995). As import weighted-average tariﬀ
rates are well known to have downward biases, we use his simple average measure. He reports this
average for several years between the early 1960s and the mid 1990s. The average tariﬀ rate was
39.9 percent in 1962 and remained at a high level until the 1970s. Thereafter, it declined steadily to
12.7 percent in 1989. We obtain measures of G7 manufacturing tariﬀ rates from Yi (2003). This is
an average of the United States tariﬀ and a tariﬀ measure that is a weighted average of Japan and
European Community tariﬀ rates.15 These tariﬀs apply to both consumption goods and investment
goods. The initial and post-reform tariﬀ rates are listed in Table 1 below.
15The Korean tariﬀ measure is for merchandise, rather than manufacturing. Agriculture and mining tariﬀsa p p e a rt o
constitute a small number of the total number of goods, so that while these tariﬀs tend to be lower than manufacturing
taiﬀs, we do not believe this discepancy will exert more than a minor inﬂuence on our results. In addition, our G7
measure excludes Canada, but includes countries outside the G7. However, because these countries are not large, we
believe that this discrepancy will also not exert a large eﬀect on our results.
18Table 1: Tariﬀ Rates (percent)
Country
Korea G7
1962 39.91 3 .95
1989 12.75 .00
Sources: Nam (1995) and Yi (2003)
We have no independent measure of "all other" trade costs. Consequently, we calibrate two
trade costs, trij,C and trij,I, one for consumption goods and one for investment goods, as part of our
overall calibration of four key variables and parameters to four targets. This is discussed further
below.
3.2 Calibration of Other Variables and Parameters
We calibrate the labor endowments Li to match manufacturing employment in Korea and the G7
in 1963. We begin with the measures of workers from the Penn World Tables (PWT) version 6.1.
We use the Bank of Korea’s Economic Statistics Yearbook to obtain the manufacturing share of
employment in 1963 and multiply that by Korea’s employment from the PWT. This yielded 743.3
thousand manufacturing workers. For the G7, we used the OECD’s STAN database, which has
manufacturing and total employment data for each of the G7 countries. However, this data start
only in 1970. We assume the manufacturing share of employment in 1963 was the same as in 1970.
We multiply this share by G7 employment from the PWT and obtain 62.13 million manufacturing
workers.
Turning to the intermediate shares, θ1 and θ2,w h e nθ1 = θ2 = θ, it can be shown that the
value-added/gross output ratio in each country is 1 − θ. In Korea, the value-added/gross output
ratio in 1963 was 0.31. In the G7 nations, this ratio ranged from a low of 0.32 (Japan) to a high of
0.39 (United States).16 We set θ1 = θ2 = θ =2 /3.
The labor income share, 1 − α, varies widely across countries. According to Young (1995),
Korea’s labor share of value-added in manufacturing was 0.504 percent in the early 1960s. From
the STAN database, the labor share in 1970 ranged from a low of 0.399 (Japan) to 0.742 (United
Kingdom). In the United States, it was 0.728. We set α =0 .4.
16There was no data for West Germany in 1970.
19The key trade elasticity parameter other than the intermediate shares is the heterogeneity in
productivity parameter, n. As stated above, this corresponds to an elasticity of substitution in
monopolistic competition or Armington aggregator models of n +1 .17 (Hereafter, we refer to the
elasticity-equivalent of the parameter.) This elasticity is assumed identical across countries. EK’s
estimates of n range from 3.6 to 12.86. Other prominent estimates include Baier and Bergstrand
(2001) and Head and Ries (2001), who estimate substitution elasticities of 6.43 and 7.9, respectively.
In the previous section, we demonstrated that under multi-stage production the responsiveness of
trade to trade costs depends on both the elasticity of substitution and the “magniﬁcation eﬀect”.
Consequently, existing estimates of the substitution elasticity may be upwardly biased. Hence, we
set n =4 .
Three dynamic parameters are set by using values from related research. Ogaki, Ostry, and
Reinhart (1996) estimate the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1/σ,t ob e0.6. for developing
countries. The next two parameters are drawn from Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1994). We set
the annual capital depreciation rate, δ, to 0.1.18 Finally, we set β, the preference discount factor,
to 0.96, which corresponds to a real interest rate in steady-state of a little more than 4 percent.
The ﬁnal parameters to specify are the Frechét mean productivity parameters, TiC and TiI,f o r
the two countries, and for two consumption stages and one investment stage — six parameters —
and "all other" trade costs, trij,C and trij,I, for consumption goods and investment goods. With
no loss of generality, we normalize the productivity parameters for the United States consumption
and investment sectors to 1. We assume that Korea has no particular comparative advantage in
stage 2 production relative to stage 1 production. This leaves two productivity parameters and
the two trade costs. We set these parameters and costs so that they meet four targets: Korea /
G7 manufacturing output per worker; Korean export share of GDP; share of imported investment
goods in Korea’s GDP; share of Korea’s imports that are consumption goods.19 In other words, we
set these parameters and costs so that the model-implied steady-state for Korea in 1963 matches
the key facts about Korea’s per worker output and trade in manufacturing. Table 2 lists all the
calibrated parameters and variables.
17See Eaton and Kortum (2002, p. 1750, fn. 20) or Anderson and van Wincoop (2004, p. 710).
18Given that most investment goods produced by the manufacturing sector is equipment, a higher depreciation
rate might be warranted. We solved the initial steady-state, as well as the eﬀects of all three trade reforms, using the
equipment depreciation rate from Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni (1987), 0.13. The results were virtually identical.
19Hitting these targets also implies that the model will match the share of intermediates in Korean trade.
20Table 2: Other Calibrated Parameters and Variables
Parameter Value
Korea labor, LKorea 0.7433
G7 labor, LG7 62.13
Intermediate input share, θ1= θ2 2/3
Capital income share, α 0.4
Frechét heterogeneity, n 4
Intertemp. elasticity of substit., 1/σ 0.6
Capital depreciation rate, δ 0.1












Korea export share of GDP (0.1469) 0.793
trij,C Imported investment share of GDP (0.03991) 0.672
trij,I Consumption share of imports (0.02523) 0.172
The last four rows of the table show the values of the productivity parameters and trade costs
that enable the model to meet the four targets in the initial steady-state. For ease of interpretation,
the productivity parameters are normalized relative to the labor force in each country.20 The values
indicate that Korea has a comparative advantage at producing consumption goods over investment
goods. Also, the all other trade costs for consumption goods (67.2 percent) are considerably higher
than for investment goods (17.2 percent). This largely reﬂects the fact that Korea had an extensive
quota system applied primarily to consumption goods. This shows up in the very low share of
imports that were consumption goods (2.52 percent). Hence, the total trade cost for consumption
goods, including tariﬀs, transport costs, and all other costs, in 1962 was 1.399×1.092×1.672−1=
155.4 percent.
3.3 Solution
Given the parameterization of the model in Table 2 and the trade cost data in Table 1, the model
will deliver an equilibrium set of factor prices, goods prices, production quantities, trade ﬂows, and
vertical specialization ﬂows. We ﬁrst solve for the initial steady-state in 1963. This solution also
20In a closed economy Eaton and Kortum (2002) setting, doubling capital and labor reduces per capita income
unless T also doubles. When T doubles, then, per capita income remains constant.
21includes the productivity parameters and trade costs that yield relative value-added per worker,
trade share of GDP, and sectoral shares in trade that match their data counterparts in 1963. Then,
we simulate the trade policy reforms, individually and in aggregate. Unlike in EK, an exact solution
to the model cannot be computed. Instead, we must ﬁnd an approximate solution. To do so, we
approximate the [0,1] continuum with 2,500,000 equally spaced intervals; each interval corresponds
to one good or one stage of one good. Further details on the solution method are in the appendix.
4R e s u l t s
We now assess the quantitative importance of the three sets of tariﬀ reductions in explaining
Korea’s catch-up to the G7 in GDP per worker and export share of GDP. We also assess whether
the model can replicate the growth of Korea’s vertical specialization, as well as the changing
sectoral composition of its trade, and whether a Hall and Jones (1999) development accounting
decomposition matches what is in the data.
We ﬁrst present the initial steady-state along with the corresponding data:












Actual data (1963) 0.171 0.147 0.0399 0.0252 0.01257 0.98
Initial steady-state 0.171 0.147 0.0399 0.0252 0.00505 1
Note: Y ,G D P ;L,labor; M,i m p o r t s ;VS ,vertical specialization; InvM and ConM,
imported investment and consumption; Kshare, share of capital that is for domestic sales;
The ﬁrst four columns were calibrated to match the data. Among the two columns on the right,
note that the model implies an initial steady-state VS /Y ratio that is about 2/5 of what it is in
the data, and an initial capital share devoted to domestic sales that is close to the true value of
0.98. These are two diagnostics that suggest the model is an appropriate one to analyze the eﬀects
of the three trade policy reforms.
The ﬁrst two rows of table 4 present the actual data in 1963 and 1995, respectively. For
relative output per worker, we report the logarithmic growth rate between 1963 and 1995. We
refer to that growth rate, 0.837, as Korea’s "catch-up" in relative value-added per worker. Our
ﬁrst simulation is to implement the tariﬀ exemption on imported inputs and investment goods as
22long as they are used to produce goods for export. Westphal and Kim (1977) compute eﬀective
rates of protection for Korean industries; they conclude that exporters faced essentially a free trade
environment. Consequently, in implementing this simulation, we reduce all other trade costs, in
addition to tariﬀs, to zero, as they likely represented other political barriers such as quotas and
commodity taxes. Hence, trade costs for these goods are only the transport costs.











Actual data (1963) 0.147 0.040 0.025 0.013
Actual data (1995) 0.837 0.923 0.42 0.095 0.21
(1) Tariﬀ exemption 0.0192 0.769 0.12 0.0069 0.17 < 0
(2) Korea tariﬀ reduction 0.0621 0.455 0.12 0.024 0.050 0.76
(3) GATT tariﬀ reduction 0.0139 0.224 0.060 0.025 0.012 0.75
( 1 )+( 2 )+( 3 ) 0.1724 1.656 0.24 0.0098 0.77 0.29
( 1 )+( 2 )+( 3 )+" l e a k a g e " 0.2688 1.690 0.25 0.0037 0.81 0.62
Note: Y ,G D P ;L,labor; M, imports (exports); VS ,vertical specialization; InvM and ConM,imported
invest and consum; TFPshare, share of catch-up that is accounted for by TFP;
"leakage", imported inputs and investment goods are exempt from tariﬀs even for domestic sales;
The third row of Table 4 provides the results of this simulation. The tariﬀ exemption generates a
little more than 2 percent of the GDP per worker catch-up, a very small amount. Not surprisingly,
this policy does better at capturing the increase in the export share of GDP with the model
predicting a rise from 14.7 percent to 76.9 percent. In the data, it rose to 92.3 percent. The policy
also does well at predicting the increase in vertical specialization. Relative to the initial steady-
state, the model generates a tripling of the share of imported investment goods in GDP, but in the
data it increased by a factor of 10. The model delivers a counterfactual prediction on the change
in the consumption share of imports, as well. Overall, this policy does fairly well in explaining the
increases in trade, with the exception of the consumption share of imports; however, it has very
little explanatory power for the catch-up in GDP per worker.
I nt h ef o u r t hr o wo ft h et a b l e ,w ee x a m i n et h ee ﬀects of the broad reduction in Korean tariﬀs.
This policy captures about 6 percent of the GDP per worker catch-up, about three times more
23than the tariﬀ exemption policy, although still a small fraction of the actual catch-up. However,
the trade and vertical specialization shares of GDP rise by less than in the tariﬀ exemption policy.
The policy clearly delivers more "bang for the buck", in that a given increase in trade ﬂows is
associated with a considerably larger increase in GDP per worker catch-up.
Why does the tariﬀ exemption have a much smaller "bang for the buck" than the broad Korea
tariﬀ reduction? With the tariﬀ exemption, the aggregate investment good used to produce export
goods becomes considerably cheaper than the aggregate investment good used to produce goods sold
domestically. Hence, ﬁrms ﬁnd it cheaper to substitute from domestic sales to export production.
The share of capital that is for domestic sales declines from 1 to 0.753. Indeed, the absolute level
of domestic sales capital falls by about 20 percent. This substitution eﬀect partially explains the
small increase in output. In addition, the diﬀerence in prices between the two investment goods
creates a distortion, which is why a fairly substantial increase in the capital/output ratio does not
show up as output per worker gains. Indeed, aggregate TFP declines in this scenario. By contrast,
virtually the opposite happens when there is a broad tariﬀ reduction. Imports of investment goods
increase, and they are allocated to their most eﬃc i e n tu s e ,r a t h e rt h a no n l yu s e dw i t hi m p o r t e d
inputs and sold only for the export market. The aggregate TFP gains are much larger under a
broad tariﬀ reduction; as Table 4 shows, they account for about 3/4 of the overall catch-up.21
The ﬁfth row of the table presents the results from the GATT reduction in G7 tariﬀs. The
reduction in tariﬀs in the ROW somewhat surprisingly has a small eﬀect on Korea’s catch-up and
trade. These eﬀects are smaller than those from the tariﬀ exemption.
The next row presents the results from combining all three policies. The most interesting ﬁnding
is that the eﬀect of all three policies together on GDP per worker catch-up is about twice as large
as the sum of the eﬀects of each policy implemented individually. Taken together, the policies can
explain about 21 percent of the catch-up. Clearly there is a positive interaction eﬀect among these
policies on output. If anything, one might have expected that the combined eﬀect would be less than
the sum of each, because the broad tariﬀ reduction blunts the eﬀect of the tariﬀ exemption.22 There
is an interaction eﬀect on trade, as well. However, in this case the model over-predicts the export
and vertical specialization shares of GDP by a factor of two and four, respectively.23 The model
21We employ the Hall and Jones (1999) method, which draws from Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), to compute
the relative contribution of TFP and K/Y.
22The interaction eﬀect also applies to each individual broad tariﬀ reduction. That is, the catch-up when both the
Korean and G7 tariﬀ reductions are implemented simultaneously is considerably larger than the sum of the catch-up
eﬀects from the Korean tariﬀ reduction and from the G7 tariﬀ reduction.
23Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2008) show that in the presence of policies that explicitly encourage vertical special-
ization, the HIY methodology for computing VS underestimates the true level of VS. This suggests that the actual
24captures about half of the increase in the imported investment share of GDP, but counterfactually
predicts that the consumption share of trade falls. Essentially, the tariﬀ exemption encourages
imported intermediates at the expense of imported consumption and investment goods.
In the early years of Korea’s trade reforms government oﬃcials found it diﬃcult to enforce the
tariﬀ exemption policy. Taken literally, the imported inputs and capital could not be used at all for
production for domestic sale. In practice, owing to wastage allowances, cheating, and other forces,
these inputs and capital were often used for domestic production and sale. Indeed, this led to a
shift in policies over time from an outright exemption to a duty drawback type of policy in which
exporters had to ﬁrst pay the full price for imports and then ﬁle paperwork to claim the rebate.24
To model the "leakage" of these imported inputs and capital, we modify the tariﬀ exemption policy
to allow for duty-free importation of inputs and capital goods for domestic sale, as well. The results
are reported in the sixth row. Now the trade policies can explain almost one-third of the catch-up.
Moreover, the implications for the export share of output, vertical specialization, the imported
investment share of GDP and the consumption share of imports, are about the same as in the
previous simulation. Finally, the importance of TFP in accounting for the catch-up is considerably
higher.25
In our simulations we hold the transport cost and the "all other" cost of importing consumption
goods constant. Undoubtedly some of these costs were captured by quotas; over time the quotas
were relaxed. For example, Korea went from a positive list quota system, in which goods not
subject to quotas were explicitly listed, to a negative list system, in which goods subject to quotas
were explicitly listed. In other words, under the new policy, the presumption was that goods would
not be subject to quotas unless otherwise speciﬁed. Hence, this policy probably led to a greater
share of consumption goods in imports than otherwise.
To understand further the quantitative importance of two key transmission channels, we engage
in three further simulations. We ﬁrst assess the importance of imported investment goods. Begin-
ning from our initial steady-state, for 1963, we ﬁrst shut down trade in investment goods. The eﬀect
is quite small; Korea’s output per worker relative to that of the G7 falls by about 0.5 percent. This
is not surprising, because Korea was not importing a lot of investment goods initially. A better
VS in Korea in 1995 was greater than the reported number, and the gap with this simulation smaller than indicated
by the table.
24See Ianchovichina (2007) for an analysis of duty drawbacks.
25Applying the Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) methodology to the ﬁndings of Young (1995) yields the im-
plication that close to 100% of Korea’s growth in per capita output in manufacturing is accounted for by TFP
growth.
25assessment of the importance of investment goods is to study the eﬀects of the three trade policy
reforms when trade in investment goods is not allowed. The fourth row of Table 5 presents the
results of that simulation. For comparison, the third row presents the results of the three policies
in the benchmark model. When trade in investment goods is not allowed, the catch-up in GDP
per worker is only about 2/3 as large relative to the benchmark model. Put diﬀerently, access to
trade in investment goods generates close to a 50 percent larger catch-up. In addition, the model’s
implications for the growth in trade and vertical specialization are smaller — although they are
closer to the actual growth rate.











Actual data (1963) 0.147 0.040 0.025 0.013
Actual data (1995) 0.837 0.923 0.42 0.095 0.21
( 1 )+( 2 )+( 3 ) 0.172 1.656 0.24 0.0098 0.77
(1)+(2)+(3) without imported investment 0.118 1.189 0.00 0.017 0.46
(2)+(3) 0.107 0.636 0.16 0.025 0.099
(2) + (3) without multi-stage production 0.0561 0.241 0.19 0.21 0.00
(2)+(3) without multi-stage production and 0.0116 0.104 0.00 1 0.00
imported investment
Note: Y ,G D P ;L,labor; M, imports (exports); VS ,vertical specialization; InvM and ConM,imported
investment and consumption
Second, we assess the importance of multi-stage production. Again, starting from the initial
steady-state, we ﬁrst shut down multi-stage production. Per worker output in Korea relative to
the G7 falls by about 1 percent. We then implement the broad Korea tariﬀ reduction and the
GATT tariﬀ reduction — the tariﬀ exemption for imported inputs cannot be applied here — and
compare it against the eﬀects of these two policies in the benchmark model. The results are given
in the ﬁfth and sixth rows of the table. They show that multi-stage production facilitates almost
a twice as large catch-up in GDP per worker. In addition, the implications for trade and vertical
specialization, relative to the one-stage model, are considerably larger and closer to the 1995 data.
Finally, we assess the importance of imported investment goods and multi-stage production.
When we shut down both channels, output per worker relative to that of the G7 falls by 2 percent.
26The results from implementing the two broad tariﬀ reductions are given in the ﬁnal row of Table 5.
Output per worker relative to the G7 rises by only 1.2 percent. The presence of these two channels,
then, leads to a catch-up that is more than nine times larger; we conclude that imported investment
and multi-stage production are responsible for almost 90 percent of the catch-up induced by these
two broad tariﬀ reductions.
Our simulations show that the broader tariﬀ reductions have considerably more explanatory
power for Korea’s GDP per worker catch-up than the tariﬀ exemptions policy. In addition, these
policies together exert a stronger eﬀect than the policies in isolation. Clearly, there is a positive
interactive eﬀect. The model does too well in explaining the growth of trade, but it falls short
in explaining the catch-up. Nevertheless, the combined eﬀect of all three policies is not small.
Depending on whether "leakage" is allowed, the policies can explain 21 or 32 percent of the catch-
up. Further analysis shows that the twin channels of imported investment goods and multi-stage
production explain almost 90 percent of Korea’s catch-up induced by the two broad tariﬀ reductions.
5C o n c l u s i o n
We study the eﬀects of trade policy reforms on per capita gdp growth using a neoclassical model of
growth and trade calibrated to South Korea and the G7 countries. South Korea’s growth miracle
in the three-plus decades following 1961 have been well-documented. There were three key trade
reforms. Korea granted tariﬀ exemptions on imported inputs and capital goods used to make
export goods. Korea also engaged in a broad tariﬀ reduction. Finally, the advanced nations, the
recipients of most of Korea’s exports, lowered their tariﬀs through two GATT rounds, the Kennedy
and Tokyo rounds.
Our main ﬁnding is that these three policies account for about 1/5 of Korea’s catch-up in
manufacturing GDP per worker. If duty-free imported inputs and capital goods are allowed for
domestic production, as well, the policies can account for almost 1/3 of the catch-up. In this
latter case, aggregate TFP growth accounts for more than 60 percent of the catch-up. We also
ﬁnd an interaction eﬀe c ta m o n gt h e s ep o l i c i e s ;t h ec o m b i n e de ﬀect on Korea’s per worker is about
twice as large as the sum of the eﬀects of each individual policy. The trade reforms explain too
much of Korea’s trade and vertical specialization growth, however. Further experiments show that
access to imported investment goods, as well as multiple stages of production and the additional
specialization this engenders, are quantitatively signiﬁcant in generating the above ﬁndings.
27We brieﬂy describe two useful extensions. The ﬁr s tw o u l db et os t u d yt h ee ﬀects of ﬁscal and
ﬁnancial reforms also oriented to exporters. This would require a setting in which distortions other
than trade distortions are present. The second would be to expand the model beyond manufacturing
by including primary commodities and services, either separately or jointly. This would enable the
quantitative analysis to provide a more balanced and complete assessment of the role of trade
policies in explaining Korea’s growth miracle.
AA p p e n d i x
A.1 Solution for zh in the special case of the multi-stage production model case
For goods ultimately consumed in the home country, there are two production methods, HH and
HF. Ordering the continuum of goods according to declining home country comparative advantage
in stage 2 production, there is a cutoﬀ zhfor which goods on the interval [0,zh] are produced by
HH, and goods on the interval [zh,1] are produced by HF. This cutoﬀ is determined by the
arbitrage condition that the price of purchasing this good (by a home country consumer) is the
same across the two methods:
































Solving for zhyields (24).
A.2 Solution Method
We compute an approximate solution to the model. We approximate the [0,1] continuum with
2,500,000 equally spaced intervals; each interval corresponds to one good or one stage of one good.
We ﬁrst solve for the initial steady-state, which includes the productivity parameters and trade
costs that enable the model to match the four targets: relative per worker output, export share of
GDP, investment import share of GDP, and consumption share of imports.
We then solve the model under diﬀerent combinations of the trade reforms. We reduce the
model to ten equations in ten unknowns (two wages, four aggregate price indices, three capital
stocks and one aggregate intermediate). For each country, we draw a stage 1 productivity and a
stage 2 productivity from the Frechét distribution for each of the 2,500,000 consumption goods
and a productivity from the Frechét distribution for each of the 2,500,000 investment goods. We
then calculate for each country the cheapest production method for each consumption good and
28each investment good. Finally, we assess whether the resulting pattern of production, trade, and
prices is consistent with labor market equilibrium, capital market equilibrium, intermediates goods
market equilibrium, and with the candidate aggregate prices. The model uses a Gauss-Newton
algorithm to adjust the candidate vector until these conditions are met. The algorithm takes about
15 minutes in Gauss.
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